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The Political Economy of Special Economic 
Zones: Lessons for the United States 
Lotta Moberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a policy change that could spur economic 
development without costing a dollar. A change that could increase 
employment in selected areas of a country through the growth of 
the industries of policy makers’ choices. The change in question is 
the special economic zone (“SEZ”). This article explores the 
benefits and downsides of SEZs, and analyzes their economic and 
political impact on the United States. It argues that, though 
widely implemented in the country, SEZs have likely done more 
harm than good for the United States.  
SEZs are areas where a government chooses to have different 
rules from the rest of the country. The zones are usually designed 
to attract investors in various industries with the aim to increase 
exports, employment, and production. SEZs are credited with 
promoting development in numerous countries, from the large-scale 
zones of China to the small industry parks scattered throughout 
Latin America and Asia.1 In the past few decades, several African 
countries have introduced SEZ legislation, often with the hope of 
emulating the rapid industrialization of the Asian “Tigers.”2 
 
 * Lotta Moberg is the author of The Political Economy of Special Economic Zones: 
Concentrating Economic Development. She has published articles on targeted tax 
benefits, municipal bankruptcy, and tax harmonization in addition to special economic 
zones. She is part of the Dynamic Allocations Strategies Team at William Blair and 
advisor at Politas Consulting. She thanks Tom W. Bell and Brian D. Singer for their 
valuable comments and suggestions. 
 1 See, e.g., Hooshang Amirahmadi & Weiping Wu, Export Processing Zones in Asia, 
35 ASIAN SURV. 828, 828–29 (1995); ANTOINE BASILE & DIMITRIOS A. GERMIDIS, INVESTING 
IN FREE EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 11 (1984); Gokhan Akinci & James Crittle, Special 
Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development 32 
(World Bank Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Working Paper No. 45869, 2008); 
ROBERT C. HAYWOOD, Free Zones in the Modern World, WEPZA 3 (2000); Thomas Farole & 
Gokhan Akinci, Introduction to SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: PROGRESS, EMERGING 
CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 4–5 (Thomas Farole & Gokhan Akinci eds., 2011); 
Jin Wang, The Economic Impact of Special Economic Zones: Evidence from Chinese 
Municipalities, 101 J. DEV. ECON. 133, 145–46 (2013). Most of these sources also note some 
of the problems with the SEZ model. 
 2 THOMAS FAROLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING PERFORMANCE 
AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCE 166–67 (2011). 
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SEZs are not without their controversies, and as this article 
argues, the United States has largely failed to implement them in 
a way that promotes economic growth. The World Bank proposed 
in the early 1990s that SEZs are inferior to “economywide” 
reforms.3 Some zones have failed to attract investors, despite 
generous incentives. Clearly, the policy does not always succeed. 
SEZ success, as discussed below, is also commonly misunderstood 
and can be defined in many different ways. 
Most of the early SEZs, which focused on reshipping and 
warehousing, were found primarily at ports and airports, and 
served as spaces for tariff relief. The shipping and warehousing 
industries rely on importing and exporting goods. If the government 
imposes tariffs to protect its domestic industries, this clearly hurts 
the import-dependent industries. In this environment, SEZs can 
allow the shipping and warehousing industries to flourish. As long 
as they cannot buy their wares domestically, allowing them to 
import tariff-free causes no harm on the domestic producers that 
enjoy tariff protection. 
SEZs have been around in their modern form at least since 
the 1950s. One of the first modern SEZs came about as the scope 
of the free zone at the Shannon Airport in Ireland was expanded. 
The airport had previously relied on air traffic in need of refueling 
airplanes on their way across the Atlantic.4 The introduction of the 
jet engine made this business model obsolete.5 The zone authority 
therefore decided to lure production to the zone as well, thus 
growing the town of Shannon and inducing air traffic for more 
reasons than mere transit.6 
The Shannon zone represented an early version of the export 
processing zone, which is the form of SEZs that has prevailed ever 
since.7 Export processing zones take the form of industrial parks, 
which means that they only contain production facilities, as 
opposed to also including residential areas.8 They are generally 
small enough to fit within a few blocks. Governments often require 
that most or all zone investor production be exported—hence the 
label of the zone. Some SEZs are even smaller. So-called single 
factory zones9 may host a single company and occupy one floor in 
an office building. 
 
 3 THE WORLD BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 1 (1992).  
 4 BRIAN CALLANAN, IRELAND’S SHANNON STORY: A CASE STUDY OF LOCAL AND 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 47 (2000). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 50. 
 7 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 25. 
 8 Id. at 24. 
 9 Akinci & Crittle, supra note 1, at 3. 
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The variation, size, and form of SEZs—from the multimillion-
people zones of China to one-company schemes—implies that 
there is no one answer to the question of whether SEZs represent 
good policy. Depending on their size, regulations, and institutional 
context, they will function very differently and come with very 
different problems and benefits, as this article explores. 
The United States introduced free zones in 1934 in response 
to the Smooth-Hawley tariffs.10 This new-found protectionism 
threatened the U.S. warehousing and reshipping industry, and 
the zones isolated this segment of the American economy from 
much of this protectionism regime. Since then, SEZs have 
proliferated in the country and now amount to around 750, 
including smaller zones.11 
Despite their ubiquity, the U.S. zones have had little impact 
on economic development in the country.12 This paper applies a 
political economy analysis to SEZs and shows that the reason for 
their limited influence in the United States lies both in the nature 
of the zones themselves and in the institutional context in which 
they are introduced. It also suggests how to make American zones 
more successful, and explains what lessons can be drawn from 
SEZs of the past. 
The next Part explains why a political economy analysis best 
assesses the costs and benefits of SEZs. Part II presents a 
framework for comparing SEZs to the status quo. Part III 
discusses whether SEZs are better than their political alternative. 
Part IV explores how SEZs can perform at their best. The paper 
concludes in Part V with a discussion of the implications for the 
SEZs in the United States. 
I. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO SEZS 
Most scholarly literature on SEZs applies a misleading 
perspective when assessing their success. Commonly stated goals 
of SEZs include increased exports, production, and employment in 
 
 10 Matthew Grant, Why Special Economic Zones? Using Trade Policy to Discriminate 
Across Importers 8–9 (Feb. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://drive.google.com/file/ 
d/0B_4Z5rmKH1P5VE0yV1QxZ0JaZTg/view. 
 11 See Tom W. Bell, Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial Charters, 
to Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward USSEZs, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 969–70 (2016); Grant, supra 
note 10, at 7–8; Benjamin Chris Zissimos, Summary of the 4th InsTED / 9th EESP-FGV 
Workshop, INSTED INSTITUTIONS TRADE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (May 31, 2017), 
http://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/insted/2017/05/31/summary-of-the-4th-insted-9th-eesp-fgv-workshop/ 
[http://perma.cc/XN2A-9V8X]; How many zones exist now?, U.S. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, 
https://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/info/zonestats.html [http://perma.cc/6UVD-PX7G] (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 12 Susan Tiefenbrun, U.S. Foreign Trade Zones, Tax-Free Trade Zones of the World, 
and Their Impact on the U.S. Economy, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L., Spring 2013, at 214. 
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the area of the zone. Such outcomes are fairly easy to measure, but 
are unfortunately quite unhelpful in determining whether a zone 
policy is actually beneficial.13 
Instead of looking only at outcomes, scholars should apply a 
cost-benefit analysis to SEZs and focus as much attention to the 
costs of the policy as to the benefits. To understand the impact of 
SEZs, one must take a political economy perspective that looks 
both at the incentives they promote and their most common 
unintended consequences. The political economy perspective 
reveals that the main costs of SEZs are political, rather than 
economic. The most severe costs are not easy (and often impossible) 
to measure with macroeconomic data. This perspective also reveals 
that the main benefits of SEZs are political too, rather than the 
economic outcomes for which the zones are commonly praised. 
There have been attempts to perform cost-benefit analyses of 
SEZs, but these are limited in scope and rely on various 
quantitative approximations. Scholars have attempted to count 
company profits, wages, and the like in an SEZ. These benefits are 
then compared with the costs of the resources used in the zone, 
which must be based on prices and wage levels in the country at 
large. If, for instance, 100 zone workers earn $10 per hour, while 
their wage elsewhere is $5, the zone adds $500 of benefits per hour 
in wages. If the return on a piece of capital, like a machine or 
natural resource, is $1 per day in the zone and eighty cents outside 
the zone, the daily value created by the zone through capital use 
is twenty cents per piece of capital. Because of the complication of 
such estimates, this type of cost-benefit analysis can apply only to 
smaller zones with simple production and no residential property. 
Even then, the costs can only be approximated, and any dynamic 
benefits, such as technological transfers from foreign investors to 
domestic firms, must be excluded.14 
A political economy analysis considers that policy makers 
cannot know the ultimate outcome of a policy. The analysis also 
accounts for the risk of a policy being abused by both businesses 
and policy makers. Any policy, SEZs included, look good on paper 
when any such political economy problems are assumed away. 
When policy makers always know the exact effect of the changes 
they introduce and govern with the best for society in mind, most 
 
 13 LOTTA MOBERG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: 
CONCENTRATING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 8 (2017). 
 14 Peter G. Warr, Export Processing Zones: The Economics of Enclave Manufacturing, 
4 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 65, 77 (1989); Kankesu Jayanthakumaran, Benefit-Cost 
Appraisals of Export Processing Zones: A Survey of the Literature, 21 DEV. POL’Y REV. 51, 
61–62 (2003). 
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policies are beneficial. Alas, the reality is that policy-makers 
inevitably have a poor understanding of the market conditions 
that they seek to affect. Just like businesses, they are also 
motivated by their own wellbeing. Under the wrong incentive 
structures therefore, they will take advantage of their positions to 
the detriment of society at large. Whether policy makers will act 
as if they are informed and selfless will depend on the institutional 
environment in which a policy is introduced.  
Classical economic models generally assume away political-
economy related frictions stemming either from the ignorance or 
distorted incentives of government officials. These models assume 
that policy makers aim to maximize social welfare, have perfect 
knowledge, and that the system is free of fraud or corruption. Alas, 
reality is famously fraught with such imperfections, an insight 
that a political economy analysis takes into account. 
An assessment of SEZ success must also account for political 
economic benefits that standard macroeconomic studies generally 
overlook. Political influence can be for the better if it leads to 
beneficial policy changes. If these spread beyond the SEZ, they can 
catalyze beneficial change in the country as a whole.  
SEZs should be deemed successful if they have long-term 
beneficial impacts on the broader host economy. Focusing only on 
one or a few macroeconomic variables as indicators of success is 
too narrow. Yet “beneficial” can have a different meaning, 
depending on the reference point. As such, SEZs may be seen as 
beneficial in three different ways: 
1. Compared to the status quo: 
  Would the country be better off without them, assuming 
  all else stays the same in their absence? 
2. Compared to their political alternative: 
  Would the economy be in worse shape with the policies  
  that would be introduced in the absence of SEZs? 
3. Compared to their best possible outcome: 
  Are the SEZs living up to their full potential? 
The following three Parts discuss these levels of SEZ success 
in turn. 
II. COMPARING SEZS TO THE STATUS QUO 
SEZs famously have many advantages. By attracting 
investors, they increase economic activity in the designated area 
Do Not Delete 4/24/2018 4:57 PM 
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and provide employment for the local population.15 They may also 
increase the demand for local products. When looking only at these 
benefits, SEZs seem like a winning proposition for any economy.  
Unfortunately, SEZs can also come at great costs that, in a 
bad scenario, overshadow the benefits. While it is true that 
market-friendly SEZ policies generally increase economic 
activity in the country as a whole, the investments needed to 
make this happen may come at too high a price to make the 
policy worthwhile. 
The most obvious cost of SEZs is government spending on zone 
infrastructure.16 When planners envision an SEZ, its visible 
features usually come to mind most vividly. Governments 
commonly make sure that their visions are fulfilled by building the 
structures and offices that they expect investors to demand.17 
While that ambition is admirable, more spending on 
infrastructure means that the government must either spend less 
on other programs, raise taxes, or borrow money. In one way or 
another, the people of the country pay the bill for the zone project. 
While infrastructure costs are easily measured, SEZs also 
come with several hidden costs that are harder to estimate. One 
is the loss of revenue that the government incurs from granting 
fiscal incentives to zone investors.18 Domestic investors contribute 
more in taxes directly when located outside an SEZ. If they move 
from other parts of the country into the zones without increasing 
their production, the move constitutes a mere transfer of 
government revenue to company profits. Alas, this seems often to 
be the case for the U.S. zones. If domestic investors do expand 
and employ more people as they become SEZ investors, they can 
contribute to government revenue through income taxes, for 
instance. To account for the full impact on government finances, 
one must estimate how many more people domestic companies 
employ in the zone and what that implies in terms of increased 
income tax revenues. 
The picture is equally as complicated for foreign SEZ 
investors. It is often assumed that they would not have chosen to 
come to the country in the absence of fiscal incentives.19 If this is 
the case, no tax revenue is lost as it would not have been collected 
without a zone either. However, that will not always be true. If 
they would have invested in the country anyway, the government 
 
 15 See id. at 63. 
 16 MOBERG, supra note 13, at 8. 
 17 Id. at 9. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. at 2. 
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is foregoing revenues by offering them tax exemptions. Yet the 
government can always claim that the SEZ policy is the reason for 
any investments that enter the country, since nobody can ever 
prove the counterfactual.  
Another hidden cost is the alternative cost of domestic 
resources employed in an SEZ.20 Foreign investors may bring 
some of their employees and capital with them, but they generally 
take advantage of domestic resources too, which are removed from 
other parts of the economy. Domestic workers benefit as foreign 
companies compete for their loyalty by raising their wages, but 
this imposes costs, both on the domestic firms they leave, and on 
all firms that must meet higher wage requirements.21 To claim 
that SEZs “create jobs” is therefore partially misleading. SEZs do 
benefit workers, but as long as not all of them were previously 
unemployed, SEZ investors hire people at the expense of 
domestic companies. 
This logic applies similarly to production inputs and other 
forms of capital. As foreign investors bid up prices, they inevitably 
impose costs on other companies. In a functioning market 
economy, resources seldom lie idle. It is good for the producers of 
these production inputs that prices rise, but this is far from the 
full story. 
The value of the alternative use of either labor or capital 
cannot be measured with any precision. Attempts have been 
made for simpler forms of SEZs, as was previously mentioned, 
but such analyses will always remain best guesses rather than 
proven costs. 
Because several of these costs are difficult to measure, it is 
hard for a government to know whether the zones they are 
promoting actually benefit the economy. In their pursuit to 
increase growth and economic activity, they cannot ever be sure 
this is actually accomplished. Most analyses of SEZs presume that 
if a zone attracts investors and functions well, it has been a good 
project. However, knowing about the hidden costs of SEZs, a 
proper analysis must obviously be more complicated. 
A. Policy Implications 
A government initiating SEZs should consider how it can best 
lower its cost in relation to the benefit of any SEZ. Government 
spending on infrastructure may be necessary to attract investors 
to a zone, but will be profitable only in certain circumstances. For 
 
 20 Id. at 9. 
 21 Id. 
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one, any SEZ must be placed in areas where investors want to go. 
Numerous SEZ projects have been poorly located, resulting in 
unused infrastructure and office space. Such “white elephants” 
present obvious examples of SEZ failure.22 
In the less obvious case of failure, SEZs attract investors, but 
at a price not worth paying for the people of the country. Any 
location might be attractive to investors when endowed with 
enough government resources. By choosing a proper location, the 
government can minimize how much it has to “compensate” 
investors by paying them to come.23 
Infrastructure investments must also be suitable for the kind 
of production that is located in the zone. In order not to waste 
resources, the government must choose carefully what kind of 
production they target with its incentives and regulations. 
All of this may seem to impose an insurmountable burden on 
policy makers introducing SEZs. Yet, rather than requiring them to 
know the perfect location and policy framework for every zone, 
people in power are better off recognizing that they are not 
omniscient, and should therefore prudently set policies accordingly. 
SEZs work by rearranging economic activity in a country, with 
the goal of increasing economic activity as a whole.24 As such, there 
are inherent problems of assessing the cost of any changes in the 
current market structure. Companies in the country are located at 
particular spots for a reason. If they enter the SEZs, they are 
generally leaving a naturally optimal location for an inferior one, 
lured by fiscal incentives. It is also likely that international 
investors would not prefer the location of an SEZ, but are 
nevertheless incentivized to invest in the zone. 
Governments may get around the problem of resource 
misallocation by allowing for a more market-driven process in 
finding an SEZ location. If a government relies on private parties 
for SEZ development, people with better understanding of market 
conditions seek out the most lucrative location to establish an SEZ. 
The private zone model works as follows. The government 
announces the SEZ legislation, including the incentives offered 
and what kind of activities are permitted in the zones. Private 
developers must then buy or lease land and make all the necessary 
investments to establish the SEZs. A zone developer can then lease 
space to zone investors, who are willing to pay for the fiscal 
benefits, the infrastructure and services in the zone, and for the 
 
 22 See id. at 36. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. at 25. 
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proximity to peers and suppliers. The government need not be part 
of the location selection, but can still claim credit for the success 
of the policy. 
In addition to zone location, it is also unlikely that the 
government will know what the best industries will be for its 
SEZs. The government may think that it is textile production if 
that has traditionally been a widely spread type of production in 
the country. In fact, the economy may be better off diversifying 
into other types of manufacturing, more sophisticated agriculture, 
or high-technology production.25 The reverse is probably an even 
more common mistake. A government might believe that the 
economy should take unrealistic leaps into high-tech areas of 
production.26 In fact, what a country is already producing likely 
reflects its inherent comparative advantage, implying that it 
should focus on those industries going forward. Targeting the 
wrong industry can be a costly mistake for the government. 
Fortunately, private zone developers can also address the 
problem of finding the right kind of production. Private developers 
have both the incentive and expertise to assess what industries 
should fit for a particular location in a particular country. If 
potential investors are unknown, they can delay infrastructure 
investments until later, or work together with interested investors 
to provide the required business environment.27 For private 
investors, the costs of poorly targeted infrastructure investments 
are more immediate. As a result, they are more prone to step 
carefully in finding a successful zone model. 
Importantly, when private developers do make mistakes and 
fail to attract investors, it does not impose large costs on the 
country’s tax payers. SEZs may thus fail by not attracting 
investors, but may still be neutral from a cost-benefit perspective 
to the host country. The reason governments are often reluctant to 
rely on private SEZs is that they cannot claim credit for 
introducing a job-creating policy if the zones fail to grow. When 
areas designated as SEZs are left idle, this constitutes political 
failure, even if the attempt to establish zones imposed costs only 
on private developers and not on the country’s tax payers. 
For this reason, a government may prefer that zone 
development be in the hands of a public authority. If so, it should 
consider decentralizing the process down to the local level. The 
United States has adopted this model to a large extent. American 
 
 25 See id. at 5–6. 
 26 See id. at 38. 
 27 See id. at 56. 
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zones are often developed by county or city governments or their 
subdivisions, such as port authorities.28 This is a politically safe 
model, which is less likely than a centralized model to waste 
resources. Yet, even with decentralization, government-developed 
SEZs are prone to waste if the targeted locations or SEZ activities 
are suboptimal. However, in some cases, U.S. zones can be 
privately developed as well.29 In these cases, the federal 
government stays out of involvement in zone development and 
leaves this up to the local entities. 
Local politicians are more knowledgeable about the 
immediate business environment of any given area and are thus 
more likely to make informed decisions. They may also perceive 
and react to zone failure more rapidly and adjust policies 
accordingly. In addition, with fiscal decentralization, it becomes 
harder for local politicians to conceal the costs of an SEZ. While 
this means costs are more concentrated and can thus do more 
harm locally, it also makes it less likely for those costs to rise 
beyond proportion. As such, while decentralization does not 
ameliorate the problem with SEZ failure ultimately becoming a 
burden on tax payers, it is at least a second-best solution after 
zone privatization. 
B. SEZs and Rent-Seeking 
Besides policy makers not having sufficient information to 
create the perfect SEZ policy, they may also lack the will to do so. 
One inherent problem with SEZs is that they offer various kinds of 
opportunities for rent-seeking. It is the nature of a discriminatory 
policy that it offers people or businesses special treatments. This 
inevitably creates the incentive for private-sector actors to land on 
the right side of the policy.30 Even more destructively, policy 
makers have the incentive to introduce policies that make it easier 
for businesses to engage in policy manipulation by offering the 
policy makers various gifts and favors.31 
SEZs offer beneficial tax, tariff, and regulatory conditions for 
the businesses granted the privilege to enter.32 As long as there is 
any kind of selection between investors, there is an opportunity for 
 
 28 See Who Can Apply?, U.S. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, https://enforcement.trade. 
gov/ftzpage/info/applicant.html [http://perma.cc/N85T-BU8J] (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 29 Id. 
 30 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROGER D. CONGLETON, POLITICS BY PRINCIPLE, NOT 
INTEREST: TOWARD NONDISCRIMINATORY DEMOCRACY 3 (1998); Anne O. Krueger, The 
Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291–92 (1974). 
 31 John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History, in 
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 23, 50–51 
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006). 
 32 Id. 
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rent-seeking.33 Businesses may bribe policy makers outright, 
lobby for the rules to change in their favor, or induce policy makers 
to make exceptions for them if they do not fulfill the criteria.34 
Bribe-taking may not impose an obvious cost on the people of 
the country. After all, policy makers are benefiting at the expense 
of companies, and not directly at the expense of the people of the 
country. However, as businesses incur higher costs for entering 
the zones, they have less money for capital expenditures and for 
hiring people. As a result, they will produce, export, and benefit 
the country’s workers to a lesser extent. Rent-seeking through 
SEZs thus transfers resources from workers and the 
governmentwhich loses out on income tax revenuesto 
individual officials. 
Even if the SEZ legislators try honestly to make the policy 
work, rent-seeking can occur in various levels of the government 
bureaucracy. The more agencies a business must pass to obtain 
their SEZ entrance, the larger is the risk of bureaucrats 
extracting rents along the way, thus diminishing the benefits of 
zone investing.35 
Rent-seeking is more likely to occur in certain kinds of SEZs. 
In short, the smaller and simpler the zones, the easier it is to use 
them as vehicles for corruption.36 The smallest kind of zone is 
the single-factory zone, which includes only one company.37 
Single-factory zones make it easy for government to select 
particular investors for fiscal benefits. Governments often 
motivate these schemes with the need of certain businesses to be 
located in particular spots, such as in the center of cities, where 
one cannot set up regular SEZs. While this is a sound argument, 
the problem with introducing single-factory zones is that they 
easily serve as ways to give favors to specific companies. If a policy 
maker wants his uncle to benefit, for example, he can designate 
the uncle’s business as an SEZ, prompting the government to 
provide a source of extra profits. 
It is understandable that such a scheme would often be 
confused with simple government favoritism and targeting of 
benefits of individual companies. In practice, there is 
little difference. There will also be no agglomerative effects with 
 
 33 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 46. 
 34 Krueger, supra note 30, at 292. 
 35 See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH: ECONOMISTS’ 
ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPICS 247 (2002) (arguing that low-level 
corruption creates a tragedy-of-the-commons problem as bureaucrats maximize their gains 
from implementing policies that benefit companies).  
 36 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 56–57. 
 37 Id. at 6, 43. 
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single-factory zones, even though this is a common rationale for 
SEZs. Despite these drawbacks, single-factory zones are found in 
numerous countries with SEZ policies, the United States among 
them. It is certainly possible that rent-seeking in some cases 
drives their proliferation.  
The more zone benefits that emanate from the government, 
the harder it will be for to rid an SEZ scheme of rent-seeking. 
The more opportunities for businesses to gain from lobbying 
and graft, the more resources will be wasted on such activities. 
The best a government can do in that case is to distance itself 
from the provision of favors, through infrastructure provisions 
and selection of SEZ investors. That is, it can allow for private 
zone development. 
In addition to solving problems of finding the right location 
and zone production, private SEZs can also solve several problems 
related to rent-seeking. Private developers profit from the rents 
they charge investors. They have little incentive to extract 
additional rents illegally from private zone investors, as this 
diminishes the ability of those investors to pay rents the legal way. 
Private zone development thus means that there are fewer 
incentives for rent-seeking and less opportunity to trade rents for 
fiscal benefits. 
Private developers can reap higher profits only by using their 
resources in more efficient ways. They can, for instance, find more 
cost-efficient forms of infrastructure, they can provide better 
services and charge higher rents, and plan for agglomerative 
effects that will help improve investor profits. All of these are ways 
to create value and thus increase the probability of a successful 
SEZ. By contrast, the government’s main tool to attract investors 
is to increase fiscal incentives.38 This does not necessarily imply 
a better way of organizing production more efficiently in a 
zone—which is the way private developers are incentivized to do. 
The larger and more diversified the zones, the less likely rent-
seeking will be a major problem. With zones the size of cities, 
where people work, live, and study, the government cannot 
possibly attract investors by providing all the buildings. It must 
rely on private planning and investment to make the zone 
function. The larger the zones, the more open they must be for 
people to enter and invest. This limits the government’s ability to 
target benefits to certain sectors. Finally, larger zones make it 
harder to target specific companies. Because it will be difficult to 
benefit a specific company, fiscal incentives must be offered to 
 
 38 Tiefenbrun, supra note 12, at 12. 
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everyone in the zone, which is more expensive the larger the 
zone is. As a result, large zones are harder for governments to 
use as vehicles for rent-seeking, for which single-factory zones 
are so suitable.39 
Decentralization may solve some of the problems with rent-
seeking, albeit less effectively than private zone development.40 At 
least in a democratic system, local policy makers are more 
incentivized to promote the economy through their policy-making. 
It is easier for the people to see the connection between their 
actions and social welfare. Come next election, policy makers risk 
losing their power if they fail to live up to expectations. Thus, when 
managing an SEZ scheme, they are less likely than central 
government officials to engage in graft at the expense of economic 
success of the program. 
The incentive to avoid corruption does not, however, apply to 
less accountable officials. Bureaucrats dealing with SEZ 
applications, for instance, are seldom held accountable for poor 
economic performance and can therefore engage in graft (as long 
as they are not caught) without major repercussions.41 
Decentralization with checks and balances, therefore, is only a 
partial solution to the rent-seeking problem, and will alleviate the 
problem only in particular circumstances.  
In conclusion, SEZs do introduce some efficiencies to the 
economy. But because of their discriminatory nature, they also 
present problems related to insufficient knowledge and distorted 
incentives. In the worst case, these problems render SEZs worse 
for an economy than the status quo. That is, even a country with 
high barriers to trade, taxes too high even to maximize 
government revenue, and a prohibitive business climate may be 
better off keeping such policies and shunning SEZs. 
The main solution to these problems is private zone 
development. This zone model has been recognized as producing 
better results than public zones and is becoming increasingly 
popular as a result.42 Yet policy makers are often reluctant to cede 
control over a program to the private sector. They may want to 
benefit a particular part of the country or take credit for 
introducing a particular industry in the country. As a result, 
government-developed zones remain common throughout the 
world. Any SEZ study should therefore account for the extent of 
 
 39 MOBERG, supra note 13, at 46. 
 40 See id. at 42. 
 41 See id. at 50. 
 42 See FAROLE, supra note 2, at 37–39; Akinci & Crittle, supra note 1, at 4. 
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privately-driven investments in the zone. This may give a first clue 
about whether the scheme is even better than the status quo. 
C. Case Studies of Zone Failure 
Throughout the history of SEZs, numerous programs have 
either failed to attract investors or been so infused by 
mismanagement, miscalculations, and inefficiencies that any 
benefits they generated failed to compensate for the costs. This 
Section explains how SEZ schemes can look successful, but 
nevertheless fail to benefit the country as a whole due to hidden 
costs. In some cases, failure is obvious as SEZs fail to take off 
despite government investments in infrastructure and facilities. 
One vivid example of this is the Calabar zone in Nigeria. The 
location of the zone looked completely rational, primarily because 
of its proximity to the Calabar port.43 The plan was to dredge the 
port so that it could serve ships that would export the 
manufactured goods of the Calabar SEZ.44 However, for several 
years, the authorities tasked with the dredging failed to fulfill this 
mission. Goods were therefore shipped by truck to the port of 
Lagos at high costs. The Calabar zone is close to the Cameroonian 
border and not connected to any of Nigeria’s highways. The 
government ran the zone and chose not to privatize it. Power 
supply to the zone was unreliable, which forced businesses to run 
generators for electricity.45 It is no wonder that the number of 
investors was a small share of the capacity of the zone.46 As a 
result, much of the SEZ infrastructure was left idle.47 
Nigeria’s SEZs have seen most investments in oil-related 
industries.48 Most SEZ incentives have thus been given to oil 
extraction and production. Because oil is a lucrative and established 
industry in Nigeria, these SEZ incentives may not have done much 
to increase production and employment in the country.49 
Another case of obvious failure is the SEZ of Bataan in the 
Philippines. The area was the site of a former U.S. military base, 
and the plan was to use the existing infrastructure to create a zone 
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 46 See id. at 211–12. 
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attractive to investors. The government invested hundreds of 
millions of dollars in the zone in the 1970s and 1980s.50 The port 
was upgraded as the bridges and roads connecting the zone to 
highways and the like were inadequate. 
Nevertheless, the business potential for the zone remained 
weak and investors stayed away. The zone was allegedly too 
remote. Thus, in this case, even substantial government spending 
in the zone did not make it grow. Sixteen years after its founding, 
the Bataan zone actually became a case of failure that made the 
international community question the zone model.51 With time, 
the government spent even more money on the zone. It now hosts 
investors, so it is considered a success. However, this remains a 
case where the zone benefits for the economy can hardly live up to 
all the public investments made throughout the years. 
Because of their obvious failures, SEZs such as Nigeria’s 
Calabar zone and Bataan of the Philippines get the worse press. 
Yet they are likely not as costly for a country as zone schemes that 
look successful enough to continue without meaningful reforms, 
while relying on large investments from the government coupled 
with generous fiscal incentives. Thus, in contrast to the Calabar 
and Bataan SEZs, most unsuccessful SEZs in the world are likely 
not recognized as such. These are the zones that attract investors, 
but at a cost that cannot be justified on the basis of the benefit 
they bring to the country as a whole. 
As mentioned previously, there have been attempts at 
cost-benefit analyses for functional SEZs. These get to the question 
of whether zones are actually better than the status quo and do not 
just take it for granted whenever a zone attracts investors. Warr 
lays out a framework for cost-benefit analysis of export processing 
zones.52 Building on Warr’s work, Jayanthakumaran assesses the 
net benefit of zones.53 Their evaluations of specific SEZ schemes 
indicate that the zones in the Philippines were a net negative for 
the economy, while those in South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, and China were beneficial.54 
India’s SEZ present a prominent example of a scheme that 
was maintained despite its high costs. The rest of this chapter will 
therefore look closer at this case. India introduced its first zone in 
 
 50 See MOBERG, supra note 13, at 36. 
 51 See Peter G. Warr, Export Promotion via Industrial Enclaves: The Philippines’ 
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 52 Warr, supra note 14, at 77–81. 
 53 Jayanthakumaran, supra note 14, at 53–56. 
 54 Id. at 58. 
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1965, but it took another eight years to establish a second one.55 
In 2002, the country still had only seven SEZs.56 To put this in the 
context of the county’s development, India saw increased GDP 
growth in 1980, and even more so in the 1990s, after economically 
liberal reforms.57 This was a turnaround period for India, which 
previously had seen the so-called “Hindu rate of growth” of only 
around 1.7% in real terms between 1950 and 1985.58 
The SEZs seem to have played no part in this success. In 1984, 
around the time that the economy started to take off, India had 
only two SEZs.59 The share of Indian exports stemming from the 
zones never exceeded four percent before 1996 and reached five 
percent only in 1998.60 Also, while Indian growth relied primarily 
on services, the SEZs were more manufacturing oriented.61 
Why, then, did the scheme show such poor results? Was it a 
matter of poor knowledge of government officials or distorted 
incentives? Alas, it seems, the answer is both. It is therefore worth 
taking a closer look at these issues, one at the time. 
Much of the knowledge problem for Indian SEZs stemmed 
from the centralized nature of the scheme. The zones were 
government funded and thus came at a cost for the Indian 
taxpayers.62 In addition, from the start of the program until 1994, 
only the central government could set up a zone, after which state 
governments, agencies, and private investors could take on SEZ 
projects.63 SEZ policies were in the hands of a unit of the ministry 
of commerce. Furthermore, the task of approving investors 
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seeking to enter the zones was given to an authority placed under 
this same ministry.64 
In a country the size of India, centralized policy-making is 
bound to suffer from the limited knowledge of government officials 
about the conditions on the ground in various parts of the country. 
For the SEZs, one result of this flaw was the poor location of the 
initial SEZs in Kandla, a port city, and Falta, located by the 
Hooghly River, not far from Kolkata.65 Both locations allegedly 
lacked not only an industrial culture, but also the necessary social 
and economic infrastructure.66 The government later set up some 
zones in areas that already showed decent industrial performance, 
and these SEZs fared better.67 
It certainly does not seem that the government had an insight 
about the potential of Kandla and Falta that private investors, 
which largely stayed away from these areas, were lacking. Falta, 
in particular, remained a small part of the SEZ scheme, providing 
only one percent of its exports by 2000.68 Had the zones been 
privately developed, poor location choices would not have been 
such bad news. The companies invested in the zones would have 
lost money and been forced to relocate and start over. Alas, 
because much of the initial investments came from the central 
government, the poorly located zones inevitably imposed costs for 
the Indian economy as a whole. 
In an attempt to improve the SEZ scheme, the Indian 
government introduced a new SEZ law that came into effect in 
2005. Importantly, the law encourages privately developed zones.69 
Some of the authority of SEZ management is also transferred from 
the central government to the state government level.70 The new 
law concentrates significant power in local-level development 
commissioners, who have both regulatory and administrative 
powers. This framework has been criticized as an “extreme 
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centralization of government institutions.”71 However, while such 
a concentration may be unwise, a more local authority is at least 
more likely to understand the local market conditions, and can 
better design SEZs commensurate to the development potential of 
any area. Still, the main authority accepting applications for 
approval to establish new SEZs remains a central-government 
function.72 India has thus gone only some of the way to a 
decentralized system for its SEZs. 
Indian land policy contributes to SEZ-related misallocation of 
resources. In an unregulated market, land owners could sell land 
to prospective SEZ developers if the latter are willing to pay more 
than the land is worth for the land owners, many of whom are 
farmers. This exchange would signal that the land had a higher 
potential value as an SEZ than for its current use. However, in 
India, land prices do not reflect supply and demand because they 
are set by the state government. This price must, by law, reflect 
the value of the current use of the land, and can thus not exceed 
the value of the land derived from farming.73 Such a system 
discourages land transactions from ever taking place.  
The government’s solution to the potential dearth of land 
transactions is eminent domain. By law, the government has the 
right to expropriate land “for ‘any public purpose or for a 
company.’”74 The opportunity to seize land for SEZ use is further 
enhanced as zones are designated as public utility services, which 
per definition, are useful for social welfare.75 
Fair or not, the system disguises the information that is 
embedded in market-derived prices. It thus makes it even harder 
for the government to determine the economic benefit of 
establishing an SEZ.  
It is still unclear whether the new SEZ law sufficiently deals 
with the flaws of the previous system, but in the absence of change 
in the land laws, this is doubtful. The increasing number of private 
SEZ developers will need to turn to the state government to free 
up land for them, thus discouraging the investors to make the 
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proper cost-benefit analysis. It is therefore worth looking into 
whether the new system is more likely to solve the incentive 
problems that plagued the SEZ policies of the past. 
One prominent feature of the early SEZ scheme was the wide 
use of the single-factory model, which was introduced in 1981.76 As 
previously discussed, such zones are potent tools for rent-seeking 
and lack the positive cluster-effects that are a prominent rationale 
for setting up SEZs. By the year 1998, 1210 single-factory zones 
were operational, and by 2009, as many as 2600.77 As the selection 
process for companies designated as single-factory zones is not one 
based on competitive potential, it is not surprising that these 
companies seem not to live up to their export goals.78 
Encouragingly, the new SEZ law aims to create larger zones, 
which should steer the country away from the single-factory 
model. However, an initial minimum zone size of 1000 hectares 
was soon compromised down to 500 hectares, with exemptions for 
agriculture and IT companies.79 By 2008, only six percent of the 
zones were larger than 300 hectares, and forty percent were 
smaller than twenty hectares.80 The government even chose to set 
a maximum SEZ size of 5000 hectares due to land disputes.81 For 
perspective, the Chinese pioneering SEZ of Shenzhen covered 
32,750 hectares in 1980, a year after its founding.82 
While smaller zones are generally more prone to incentive 
problems, additional problems are introduced in India because of 
its land laws. With suppressed land prices combined with eminent 
domain, SEZ developers are incentivized to lobby officials to seize 
land on their behalf. Land will thus be found in the hands of those 
with the largest political influence, rather than those able to create 
the most value. 
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Another problem that has plagued India’s SEZ scheme for 
many years is bureaucratic corruption.83 Companies wanting to 
invest in a zone would previously have to pass through numerous 
authorities. This provided opportunities for rent-seeking as 
bureaucrats could demand unofficial payments for their services. 
A survey from 2004 found that sixty percent of responding SEZ 
companies claimed to have made “irregular payments”payments 
not registered in the booksto the SEZ-related bureaucracies.84 
The aim of the new scheme is to streamline the application 
and approval process with a so-called “single window” facility.85 
Yet it has taken time for such an institution to be set up. Admitting 
as much, the central government appealed in 2010 to state 
governments to set up their own single window facilities.86 By 
2015, a survey found that sixty-four percent of SEZ firms reported 
that no such facility existed in the state.87 SEZ investors are thus 
still faced with several steps through the bureaucracy to obtain 
approval. The bureaucratic problems with SEZs have contributed 
to the de-notification of SEZs. While in 2013, India had 580 
approved zones, there were only 405 in late 2016 and have since 
risen to 424 by July 2017.88 
In conclusion, while the Indian SEZ scheme is moving in the 
right direction on some margins, it is yet to be seen whether this 
will be enough to improve it significantly. Insufficient 
decentralization and flawed land legislation will likely keep 
causing problems related to governments not having enough 
information to properly design an SEZ that would benefit the 
country as a whole. Those same land laws, combined with a 
burdensome SEZ bureaucracy and wide use of single-factory 
zones, create distorted incentives that further discredit the claim 
that the SEZs are meant to benefit the people. 
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More private zone development should enhance the scheme. 
During its decades of existence, the dominance of government 
investment in India’s SEZs has imposed high costs that are 
ultimately borne by the Indian taxpayer. The conclusion must 
therefore be that India did not live up to the lowest bar of SEZ 
success, in that the scheme was not even better than the political 
status-quo. 
III. COMPARING SEZS TO THEIR POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE 
Even if SEZs are better than the status quo, they might still 
not benefit a country if a superior set of policies could prevail in 
their absence. For example, policy makers might feel compelled to 
liberalize the economy and consider a cut in tariffs across the 
board. As they ponder their options, they might learn about SEZs 
and find them an attractive policy alternative. With SEZs, policy 
makers can look as though they are actively promoting trade and 
development for the country. A zone is a clearly-defined space 
where policy makers claim credit for the economic activity that 
they host. They can count the amount of foreign investors and 
employees in the zone and win praise for how much capital it 
attracted and how many jobs it created.89 There will obviously be 
no mention of the public resources that the project consumed or 
how many investors simply moved within the country to enjoy the 
zone’s fiscal benefits. 
Besides the political point-scoring, SEZs have another feature 
that is even more attractive for protectionist-minded policy 
makers. SEZs allow for a dual trade system, in which the country 
as a whole can remain protectionist while opening up for imports 
only in limited spaces. Governments often protect certain sectors 
by limiting foreign competition.90 In exchange for this favor, they 
can earn rents from the protected companies, in the form or 
political support, favors, or outright bribes.91 Trade liberalization 
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threatens such relationships. If interest groups no longer receive 
support from the government, they will be unwilling to offer 
anything in return. 
While this suggests that policy makers should never consider 
trade liberalization, they may be forced to do so in the face of 
pressure from other interests. Potential investors in the country 
can complain about the lack of opportunity and widely declare that 
the country is losing jobs by keeping foreign investors away. 
Economists may write articles and speak out about how 
protectionism is impoverishing the country’s people. Foreign trade 
representatives may pressure the country to open up. 
Such demands present the dilemma for the protectionist 
government between yielding to the pressure and siding with its 
protected interest groups. SEZs offer a way out of the situation. As 
policy makers introduce zones, they can claim to pursue 
liberalization. Meanwhile, they are still protecting the interest 
groups from threatening imports by maintaining the protectionist 
regime elsewhere. Foreign investors will be happy to enter the 
zones, where they enjoy exemptions from tariffs and taxes, and 
economists and foreign government representatives may accept 
the partial liberalization as adequate, albeit not perfect. 
In this way, SEZs can be a tool to avoid trade liberalization, 
and thus serve a very different function from that with which 
they are generally associated. They may improve on the status 
quo. Yet they may not benefit the economy when the status quo 
is not the relevant comparison. In the absence of SEZs, the policy 
makers would likely need to liberalize the economy more broadly 
in the face of pressure to do so. As a result, SEZs primarily benefit 
policy makers and protected industries at the expense of the rest 
of the society. 
To understand whether SEZs are better than the status quo, 
one must consider the political context and understand the 
incentives of policy makers and the policy alternatives that they 
face. Any counterfactual scenario will remain a hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, this approach to assess SEZ benefits is superior to 
the naïve assumption that policies will remain the same in their 
absence. The very fact that a government introduces SEZs 
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Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics, 63 REV. 
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suggests that their incentives are not directly aligned with social 
welfare. The officials may have suddenly awoken to the benefits of 
economic openness. However, if the SEZs come in response to 
pressure to liberalize trade, they may be a mere tool to avoid any 
radical reforms. 
A. The Case of the Dominican Republic 
The Dominican Republic provides an example of SEZs 
introduced as a response to pressure to liberalize the economy 
broadly. The zones allow companies to import tariff-free and enjoy 
tax exemptions. Meanwhile, these SEZs remain small enough not 
to threaten the trade protection enjoyed by companies outside the 
SEZs’ boundaries. As a result, while the zones promoted Dominican 
exports, they also helped preserve a system of protectionism which, 
in the absence of SEZs, might have been eroded. 
In the 1960s, President Joaquín Balaguer inherited a country 
with a system of trade protectionism, government benefits to 
particular industries, and general government interventionism.92 
The United States occupied the country for a while and helped 
Balaguer reach his position of power, thus putting him in a 
position of loyalty towards the American government.93 
Balaguer was no natural sympathizer of free markets and 
introduced new forms of trade protection in the country. On some 
margins, though, these barriers were made more flexible.94 This, 
combined with higher prices of the crops the Dominicans exported, 
made the country wealthier, which increased the demand for 
imported goods.95 Seeing that imports could threaten domestic 
businesses, Balaguer responded by establishing even more solid 
protectionism in the country.96 
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His policies soon met resistance from several corners. 
Importantly, the U.S. government pushed for trade liberalization 
in order to access the Dominican market.97 To respond to these 
demands, while still protecting the important interest groups that 
represented domestically focused businesses opposed to foreign 
competition, Balaguer introduced SEZs in 1968. The new law 
offered companies two types of benefits: either trade protection or 
SEZ status that came with fiscal benefits. The law made the 
system of tariffs more systematic than previously, and offered 
attractive opportunities to monopolize the domestic market. The 
protectionist benefits were considered most attractive and were 
primarily seized by the politically connected elite in Santo 
Domingo. The SEZ benefits were considered less attractive and 
were claimed primarily by the less-connected manufacturers 
outside the capital.98 
While this form of liberalization was not all the United States 
had hoped for, the American government accepted the new rules 
as a partial opening of the economy.99 Balaguer thus succeeded in 
preserving and even strengthening the protectionist regime while 
pleasing the critics asking for more liberalization. In the absence 
of SEZs, the president might have had to pursue broader measures 
of liberalization. 
The Dominican zones have been praised for diversifying the 
country’s exports and for offering employment opportunities.100 
Yet, it has also been noted that the SEZs function as isolated 
enclaves that fail to transfer their sophistication and growth to the 
rest of the economy.101 An understanding of the political purpose 
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of the zones explains this outcome. Because the SEZs were 
meant to divide the economy into the traditional protected sector 
and the internationally open and export-oriented sector, the 
latter was never supposed to integrate much with the country at 
large because that would have eroded the traditional system of 
trade protection. 
The final verdict of the Dominican zones is ambiguous. They 
were better than the status quo of protectionism, but as tools to 
avoid reform, they were probably worse than the political 
alternative of broader economic liberalization. 
IV. WHEN SEZS LIVE UP TO THEIR BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME 
So far, several flaws with SEZs have been discussed that are 
commonly overlooked in analyses of their success. When the 
political economy perspective is ignored, problems of resource 
misallocation, rent-seeking, and reform avoidance are overlooked. 
Yet ignorance of the political economy aspects of SEZs also leads 
to an under appreciation of what SEZs can accomplish when they 
are at their best. This Part will examine how SEZs can help solve 
the problem of rent-seeking. 
One of the great problems in economic development is that 
destructive policies and institutions are commonly preserved 
because the ruling elite lacks the incentive to promote economic 
progress. Trade restrictions are but one example. Regulations can 
deter businesses from investing while doing little to protect 
consumers or preserve market stability. Tax systems can be too 
complex to comprehend, while offering too many loopholes to yield 
much government revenue. The list of seemingly irrational policies 
can be made long. 
A simplistic analysis may deem such policies uninformed. Yet 
they often come about and remain in place due to highly rational 
calculations from individuals in government. Most interest groups 
can benefit from regulations that restrict the power of their 
competitors. They thus have an incentive to pressure the 
government to introduce seemingly irrational rules. Every burden 
on the business community is also an opportunity for people in 
government to demand favors in exchange for exemptions.  
As a result, policy makers generally lack the incentive to 
simplify rules and make the system fairer and more transparent. 
This leads countries into destructive states of equilibria that 
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hamper their development, discourage investments, and confine 
people to poverty.102 
This is precisely the context in which SEZs can function at 
their best. By changing the incentives for policy makers, 
they can set countries on a gradual path towards more 
growth-promoting policies. 
In a system where the government prefers to preserve a 
protectionist status quo, any initiative for a change will not come 
from the top, but instead from interest groups that would benefit 
from liberalization. Just as some groups will pressure the 
government to introduce growth-suppressing policies, others will 
seek exemptions from them. A leather manufacturer, for instance, 
might lobby for tariffs on leather, while a clothes manufacturer 
would prefer exemptions from the same. One way to obtain more 
general exemptions is to introduce SEZs. In contrast to specific 
exemptions, SEZs can create a dynamic that spreads economic 
liberalization throughout the country. 
This dynamic starts with initiatives from people close to the 
SEZs who will benefit from more openness. This may be business 
people seeking new opportunities or local policy makers hoping to 
expand the local government coffers through more economic 
activity. Assuming most people in power are against more 
openness, such reformers need to offer favors or bribes in exchange 
for an SEZ. The zone, while not perfect, is the best they can obtain 
in the face of strong resistance to change. 
As the SEZ grows by attracting more investors, it starts 
having an impact on the economy at large. Some local monopolies 
wither as the SEZ inflicts more competition. Other opportunities 
for rent-seeking weaken as businesses move from other parts of 
the country to the SEZ with its inviting business environment. The 
country starts gaining the reputation of a more open economy. 
All these factors change the calculation and optimal strategy 
of local policy makers. They can pursue two different strategies of 
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enriching themselves: they can promote growth and benefit from 
higher tax revenue, or they can rent-seek by pursuing 
protectionism, giving monopoly rights to select companies. Thanks 
to their external effects, SEZs nudge this calculation towards more 
openness and reliance on tax revenue as opposed to rents from 
rent-seeking activities. As the first SEZ expands, more local 
leaders find they can benefit from more openness. 
As long as most leaders are against liberalization, no local 
leader can possibly convince the government to pursue nationwide 
liberalization. That would threaten too many interest groups from 
which the government draws its support. Yet they can enjoy most 
of the fruits of openness by obtaining SEZs, which are less 
threatening to rent-seeking anti-reformers. 
This process does not require a miscalculation of the impact of 
SEZs by any anti-reformist leader who accepts the zones in 
exchange for favors. The external effects come only after some 
time, perhaps several years. If the anti-reformers do not expect to 
be in power at that time, they are better off accepting the bribe 
today, at the expense of their successors who will lose out on 
rent-seeking opportunities. 
The process requires a system of fiscal decentralization, 
though, which allows local leaders to benefit from local tax 
collection. If not, they would always be better off promoting 
rent-seeking at the expense of tax collection. With fiscal 
decentralization, local leaders face a trade-off between tax 
revenues and gains from rent-seeking, as they cannot promote one 
without diminishing the other. 
The process is necessarily gradual and can take decades, 
depending on the size of the country. It may not seem like a great 
proposition for SEZs. Yet if the zones can change the equilibrium 
of rent-seeking in a country, they provide the solution to one of the 
main obstacles to economic development. 
A. How SEZs Reformed China 
China offers the most prominent example of a country that 
used SEZs to profoundly change the economic system of the 
country. As will be discussed, the SEZs worked to change the 
incentives of political leaders to promote reform in a context where 
broad liberalization would likely not have been possible otherwise. 
In the 1970s, China was a closed economy in many ways. 
Rent-seeking by government officials was widespread and there 
was little indication that the leaders of the economy would want 
to disrupt the illiberal status quo. Yet the country provided a 
beneficial institutional setting for SEZ-driven reforms. 
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The most important feature was the country’s 
decentralization, both on the political and fiscal front. After the 
death of Mao, the Communist party started focusing on economic 
development in the country, as opposed to class struggle.103 The 
party leaders in Beijing pursued this through political 
decentralization and incentives to local leaders to produce 
economic growth. The central government had the power to award 
local leaders if they obtained their growth targets, and unseat 
them if not.104 Yet policy-making was to a large extent left to the 
local levels of government. Fiscal decentralization meant that local 
leaders could benefit from higher tax revenues, and hence benefit 
in two ways from local growth.105 
Fiscal decentralization thus presented these officials with a 
trade-off. They could promote protectionism and benefit from 
the rent-seeking opportunities that this would provide. The 
down side of this approach, however, was suppressed economic 
growth, which lowered their tax revenues. By promoting 
liberalization in their municipality or province, local leaders 
could amass more tax revenues, albeit at the expense of limiting 
their rent-seeking opportunities.106 
The extent to which local leaders pursued growth at the 
expense of rent-seeking varied, as some areas were better 
exploited for rent-seeking and others for tax revenues. Areas close 
to trading spots, such as ports with more opportunities to benefit 
from trade and foreign investments, would offer more 
opportunities of real economic growth and tax revenues. However, 
China’s closed system probably made this difficult in most cases. 
By contrast, areas close to Beijing would likely benefit more from 
central government largesse through rent-seeking schemes. Areas 
rich in extractive industries, like mining and other natural 
resources, would also incentivize officials to take the rent-seeking 
approach, by granting exploitation rights to friends and those 
offering favors in return. 
The aggregate structure of China’s economy at the time 
suggests that rent-seeking in many cases offered the most 
lucrative opportunities. In this context, a group of business people 
with connections to Hong Kong started lobbying for exemptions 
from protectionism, to make it easier for them to conduct business 
 
 103 See Xu, supra note 89, at 1090. 
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 106 See id. 
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in the then-British colony.107 They turned to Ye Fei, Minister of 
Transport, who ultimately granted them a special deregulated 
area from which they could conduct their business from Shekou in 
Guangdong Province, adjacent to Hong Kong.108 The Shekou 
Industrial zone opened in 1979, as the first SEZ of China.109 
Seeing the benefit of the zone, the governor of Guangdong 
province started to promote SEZs for China.110 The first three 
zones officially labeled SEZs were thus located in Guangdong.111 
One of them is Shenzhen, which was only a small fishing village 
when it was designated an SEZ.112 Its special status allowed it 
to grow into a megacity of over ten million people. With more 
SEZs being introduced, more local leaders lobbied for SEZs in 
their areas.113 
The zones thus spread gradually throughout the country. 
1984 was an important year in this development, as China’s fifth 
SEZ was introduced in Hainan, together with fourteen other zones 
labeled “Coastal Cities.”114 In 1992, all provincial capitals were 
designated as SEZs, which meant that over half of all 
municipalities in China now hosted SEZs.115 
It is important to understand the mechanism through which 
the SEZs proliferated. Some previous work on SEZs in China has 
described them as test-beds for policy-making. Government 
officials could see what worked in the SEZs and then implement 
those policies in the country at large.116 This theory sells the SEZs 
short, as it suggests that they were not instrumental in 
liberalizing China. The leaders had allegedly already made up 
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their minds and were only looking for the right policies to promote 
growth. While the SEZs were tools in this pursuit, they would 
eventually have found the liberalizing reforms beneficial. 
In this story, the SEZs were a top-down project, a notion 
that fits the common story about Deng Xiaoping making China 
an economic powerhouse through his convictions and strong 
leadership. In fact, Deng Xiaoping, like most leaders, did not 
support the SEZ policy until the mid-1980s, when they started 
to prove their worth.117 SEZs can give policy makers an idea 
about the effect of certain policies, but as test-beds for reform, 
they cannot reconstruct a system built on rent-seeking into one 
of openness. 
Another often-told story about SEZs is that they function as 
showcases for reform.118 In the case of China, Communist Party 
leaders would have introduced the zones to show either other 
policy makers or the public that liberalization could create wealth. 
However, this too is a story about policy makers seeking ways to 
maximize the wellbeing of the citizenry. If this were indeed their 
goal, they would eventually understand what kind of reforms to 
introduce in this pursuit. As with SEZs as test-beds for reform, 
SEZs as showcases can benefit the country only at the margin by 
speeding up a process toward liberalization that is set to occur in 
any case. 
The power of SEZs is instead that they can change the 
incentives of policy makers from relying on rent-seeking to 
promoting growth, and this is what seems to have happened in 
China. The new SEZs gave the country an image of newfound 
openness. China was, in practice, becoming capitalist.119 Local 
leaders thus saw two main changes that affected their incentives. 
For one, it became possible to reap the rewards of economic growth 
through openness. Second, it became harder to rent-seek, as 
businesses within the country had the opportunity to move to 
SEZs with more open business environments. The trade-off 
between rent-seeking and taxation thus tilted in the favor of the 
latter for more local leaders. As they lobbied for and obtained their 
SEZs, they made rent-seeking a decreasingly attractive strategy 
for other local leaders. 
Eventually, a majority of the ruling elite in China could 
benefit more from openness and liberalization than protectionism 
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and rent-seeking. At that point, China truly had relieved itself 
from its previous destructive status quo. By 2008, ninety-two 
percent of all Chinese municipalities hosted SEZs.120 China still 
suffers from corrupt practices throughout their official 
institutions, but no more so than the United States did at a similar 
stage of development.121 
In addition to opening up the country to the world, the SEZs 
in China have avoided many of the problems that plagued the 
Indian zones. For one, political decentralization meant that 
decisions about the zones were taken on the local level by people 
who were familiar with prevailing business conditions. As a result, 
fewer mistakes were made regarding zone location and nature of 
production. Also, Chinese policy makers had little reason to use 
the zones for rent-seeking. They owe their seats to the elites in 
Beijing, who reward them for high GDP growth and can demote 
them if they fail to reach the growth targets.122 If granted an SEZ, 
they have the opportunity to secure their jobs and advance their 
careers by boosting economic growth. In many cases, the rewards 
that come from the top are larger than the rents they may extract 
by trading SEZ privileges. Similar to a democracy, China’s system 
incentivizes local leaders to promote economic prosperity, as this 
rewards them politically. 
China shows that SEZs can help profoundly change a country 
stuck in a rent-seeking disequilibrium. Still, it does not provide an 
example for how “governments” can use SEZs to promote growth. 
Had China’s ruling elite wanted to reform the country, they could 
have done so much faster than through SEZs. The zones served 
instead as tools from the people at the bottom of the hierarchy to 
promote changes that initially were against the interest of the 
majority of rulers. 
There may be no other policy that can promote such change 
so forcefully. For this to happen, though, conditions must be 
right, with sufficient decentralization and heterogeneity 
between municipalities, so that some can lead the SEZ reform 
while others follow. Alas, while it happened in China, it is 
unclear whether other countries will see a similar SEZ-led 
restructuring in the future. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SEZS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A thorough understanding of the political economy of SEZs 
allows for an analysis of the benefits and flaws of the SEZs of 
the United States. Labeled “foreign trade zones,” these were 
introduced in 1934 as a response to the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act that came about as a reaction to the Great Depression.123 
Today, there are around 750 zones, which offer investors tariff 
and tax exemptions.124 
These fiscal incentives allow zone companies to be more 
profitable by reducing the cost of doing business and encouraging 
regional commerce.125 To the extent that taxes and tariffs 
discourage the productive use of resources, SEZs in the United 
States create wealth by offsetting them. However, the zones are 
not without their critics, who primarily seem to focus on the 
limited impact the zones have on the economy as a whole. 
Tiefenbrun, for instance, points out that exports from the zones 
are only 2.6% of the total126 (this figure was closer to 2.7% by 
August 2017).127 Therefore, she concludes that the zones have done 
little to promote U.S. exports.128 
As was previously discussed, this is a flawed metric by which 
to judge SEZ success, as it tells us nothing about their net 
impact.129 The U.S. zones may be small, but as long as their costs 
are smaller than their benefits, they still constitute a good policy 
for the country. However, as will be argued here, the United States 
relies far too much on small zones, and would be better off with 
larger, more diversified SEZs that include residential 
developments and offer investors more regulatory incentives. 
There are some arguments for SEZ success in the United 
States. To start, the SEZs are largely decentralized. The federal 
government does not develop the zones, but leaves this to zone 
applicants. An applicant must be a “public or public-type 
corporation.”130 Zone development is thus open to private 
development, although there is likely much governmental influence 
through public companies. Because these are local, they likely have 
an adequate understanding of the business climate in which the 
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zones are introduced. Local policy makers should also be 
incentivized to pursue successful zones, as they must answer to 
the judgment of their voters of their economic policy-making. 
Public companies, on the other hand, do not face such 
incentives, as their positions are more akin to bureaucrats who are 
not exposed to the democratic process. Thus, the decentralization 
of U.S. SEZs go only halfway in solving the knowledge and 
incentive problems associated with centralization. Moreover, if 
public companies fail in their SEZ project, they will sometimes do 
so at the expense of the local government and hence, its tax payers. 
While the public involvement in SEZ development is a 
concern, the main problem with U.S. SEZs lies in the incentives 
they create for the actors involved. The country has unfortunately 
relied to a large extent on single-factory zones for the expansion of 
its zone scheme. SEZ developers can apply to expand their benefits 
to affiliated “subzones,” which are single companies that need not 
be located adjacent to the main zone. There are twice as many of 
such “subzones” than the 250 “general-purpose zones.”131 
The subzones are predominantly focused on manufacturing, 
and thus are likely private in most cases.132 The problem, though, 
is that such a scheme looks much like a program of targeted fiscal 
benefits for companies. In this respect, the United States looks 
much like India, with its numerous single-factory zones. This 
set-up contrasts sharply with China’s diverse SEZs with millions 
of residents. Single-factory zones incentivize companies to lobby 
for SEZ designation. They also prompt policy makers to make 
the scheme flexible enough that such lobbying is attractive. As 
a result, public resources are spent on a politically driven 
process of companies seeking benefits and officials responding 
to their demands. 
Initially, only ports could become SEZs, which would at least 
have limited lobbying to that sector. In 1950, as manufacturing 
was allowed in the zones, the opportunities they provided became 
available to a much larger part of the U.S. economy.133 With the 
introduction of single-factory zones in 1954, the field was ripe for 
widespread lobbying, as firms no longer had to relocate to obtain 
the benefits.134 Although these zones must be affiliated with 
 
 131 How many zones exist now?, supra note 11; see also Where can a Zone be Located?, U.S. 
FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD, https://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/info/adjacency.html 
[http://perma.cc/7MQ7-SAEC] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017). 
 132 Who can apply?, supra note 28. 
 133 Grant, supra note 11, at 8, 10. 
 134 Id. at 10. 
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general-purpose zones, they can potentially be located anywhere.135 
Most SEZ-based manufacturing now takes place in subzones, 
while general-purpose zones engage primarily in distribution 
and wholesaling.136 
Grant finds a significant lobbying activity surrounding the 
SEZs.137 “Industry groups, individual producers, local and state 
governments, unions, congressmen and senators, and individual 
SEZ governing bodies all lobby.”138 The board that approves SEZ 
applications often cites the lobbyists’ arguments for its decisions.139 
When a government offers fiscal benefits to single companies, such 
lobbying should be expected. The single-factory component of the 
SEZ scheme is therefore primarily a net waste of resources to the 
economy at large. Lower tariffs and taxes across the board for 
the county’s manufacturers would clearly be more beneficial. 
Thus, the zones are hardly better than such a political 
alternative. Yet, even compared to the status quo, the fact that 
the system relies on lobbying suggests that the costs of the 
scheme outweigh its benefits. 
The general-purpose zones, too, are hardly better than an 
alternative policy of lowering tariffs and taxes in a less 
discriminatory fashion. Still, these look more like traditional 
zones, and thanks to the decentralized system, they may well 
bring prosperity to the country. While ports also must lobby to 
become SEZs, the benefits brought about in applying the fiscal 
incentives over a larger area and for more companies can 
override the negatives. Whether the benefits of general-purpose 
zones outweigh the costs of the single-factory zones is 
nevertheless questionable. 
For SEZs to benefit the United States, they must be made 
larger, more inclusive, and dominated by private developers. The 
smaller the zones, the larger the incentive problems become. 
Larger and more inclusive zones can also have dynamic effects 
that spread prosperity beyond the zone borders. Rather than small 
industrial parks, the United States should allow for larger areas 
with residential developments that can offer not only fiscal but 
also regulatory exemptions. Regulatory incentives not only cost 
less for the government to provide but also open up new 
opportunities for businesses, as opposed to merely lowering 
their expenses. 
 
 135 See Where can a Zone be Located?, supra note 131. 
 136 Grant, supra note 11, at 10. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 12. 
 139 Id. at 10. 
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The SEZ scheme in the United States came about as a 
response to heightened tariffs. In that light, there are three main 
roads that the United States can take. First, the government can 
reduce the fiscal burden from which companies seeking SEZ status 
are trying to alleviate themselves. A reversal of a mistake that 
caused the problem in the first place seems logical. Alas, although 
tariffs are not as high now as in the 1930s, recent administrations 
have not done much to lower them further. Second, the 
government can maintain the current SEZ system, which most 
likely will remain a burden for the economy. Third, the 
government can reform the SEZ scheme to make it more likely 
to succeed in enhancing welfare. Seeing that the program is 
unlikely to ever be abolished, the last option has the best chance 
of coming about. 
CONCLUSION 
There is reason to be optimistic about the future of SEZs. 
Decades of experience have shown which models promote 
prosperity and which come with too many burdensome costs. 
However, to understand what makes a successful SEZ, one needs 
a political economy perspective, which accounts for institutional 
contexts and recognizes the problems caused by limited knowledge 
and distorted incentives of the policy makers involved. Experience 
and logic show that an SEZ is a potent tool, which can do much 
good and much harm, depending on how it is used. With an 
increased appreciation of the political economy perspective of 
SEZs, more zone practitioners may promote the kinds of zone 
models that most likely promote welfare in any given 
institutional context. 
The United States can also hope to learn from the rich 
experiences of the SEZs of the past. So far, the U.S. zones have 
hardly benefited the country, but that does not mean that they 
might not do so in the future. With large, privately developed 
zones, the United States can establish an SEZ policy that not only 
is better than the status quo, but also even better than its political 
alternative. In the best case, the U.S. zones may even promote 
countrywide reforms. 
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